Two Philosophers One Concept: Post-Presentation Discussion
If you’d like to see Andrew Buskell’s presentation again, then here it is!
The password is ‘Haugedegger’ (of course). Here are the questions/comments/topics that I scribbled down from the discussion. I have doubtless mangled some of them, so if you recognise an issue you raised, and would like to say more about it, then sound off in comments! If you fail to recognise an issue that you raised, then you should also stick it in the comment thread.
- What is the relationship between JH’s constitutive standards and Kant’s categories? If they’re supposed to be playing the same role, then how does this mesh with Heidegger, and the things that he thinks about Kant’s categories?
- Can/should we give a functional specification of JH’s constitutive standards?
- Is the ‘letting be’ stuff supposed to help us see how the tension between realism and interpretationalism, with regard to that which constitutive standards demarcate, should be resolved? Aren’t we still too far from realism?
- Why think this tells us about ontology, rather than epistemology? (Or: how do we decide which one it tells us about?)
- Are dinosaurs Dasein?
- Surely good science really does carve nature’s joints, independently of all this funny constitutive standards/letting be stuff?
- There are interesting parallels between the idea that we set standards for objects, and the notion of (self-)legislation in Kant’s practical philosophy.
- Interpretations are constraints on representation but not on existence (I remember minuting this, but can’t remember if it was supposed to be a friendly endorsement or a deadly torpedoing of the relevant bit of the presentation…)
Put that in your pipe and smoke it, Buskell!